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conditioned stimuli modulates their interference
with cognitive processes
Mateo Leganes-Fonteneau,1,2 Kyriaki Nikolaou,1,2 Ryan Scott,1,3 and Theodora Duka1,2
1School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QH, United Kingdom; 2Sussex Addiction Research and Intervention Centre
(SARIC), University of Sussex BN1 9QH, United Kingdom; 3Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex BN1 9QH,
United Kingdom
Stimuli conditioned with a substance can generate drug-approach behaviors due to their acquired motivational properties.
According to implicit theories of addiction, these stimuli can decrease cognitive control automatically. The present study (n
=49) examined whether reward-associated stimuli can interfere with cognitive processes in the absence of knowledge about
stimulus–outcome contingencies. Conditioned stimuli (CS) were paired with high-reward (HR) or low-reward (LR) proba-
bilities of monetary reward using a Pavlovian learning task. Participants were categorized as Aware or Unaware of contin-
gencies using a Bayesian analysis. CS were then used as task-irrelevant distractors in modified flanker and N-back tasks.
Results show HR CS can generate increased interference in the flanker task for participants Unaware of contingencies, con-
tributing further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning. For the N-back task, working memory per-
formance was affected by HR CS, albeit only for Aware participants. These results suggest that CS can interfere implicitly
with cognitive processes in a similar way to drug-related stimuli. Such an effect could occur in a stimulus-driven fashion,
devoid of top-down goal-directedness. These findings have implications for the conceptualization and study of implicit pro-
cesses in addiction and highlights the necessity to reconsider the measurement of such phenomena.
[Supplemental material is available for this article.]
Motivational properties of stimuli associated with substances are
known to play a crucial role in the development of addictive behav-
iors. Through repeated associations with drug effects, drug-related
stimuli acquire incentive salience (Goldstein and Volkow 2002;
Berridge and Robinson 2003), a quality that ultimately drives
and directs motivational responses. The instatement of those re-
sponses is posited to occur via mechanisms similar to that of
Pavlovian reward conditioning (Stewart et al. 1984).
In humans, responsiveness to drug-related stimuli has been
evaluated via attentional processes (Field and Cox 2008), and emo-
tional (Pool et al. 2016) or autonomous (Carter and Tiffany 1999)
reactivity. Attentional biases toward drug-related stimuli have been
consistently observed for different substances (Bonson et al. 2002;
Bradley et al. 2008; Moeller et al. 2009; Garland et al. 2012; Field
et al. 2013), commonly evaluated using dot probe tasks (i.e.,
Townshend and Duka 2001) targeting overt attention allocation.
Other techniques assessing biases toward drug-related stimuli
consist of eye-gaze measurements (Hogarth et al. 2006b) or inter-
ference tasks such as the Addiction-Stroop test (Cox et al. 2006).
Interference by task-irrelevant drug-related stimuli has also been
evaluated using working memory (WM) tasks (Hester and
Garavan 2009) particularly with cocaine addicts.
Nikolaou et al. (2013a) further examined themechanisms un-
derlying cue interference in cognitive control using a modified
flanker task (Eriksen and Schultz 1979); they found that
task-irrelevant alcohol-related stimuli increased RT under high
cognitive load, thus proving the effect of drug-related stimuli in
the attenuation of cognitive control resources necessary for correct
task performance.
Others have also examined the ability of emotionally salient
stimuli to interfere with WM using an N-back task (Ladouceur
et al. 2009). In this procedure, participants have to respond to tar-
gets occurring in a sequence of stimuli. In the case of a 0-back con-
dition, this simply means responding when a given stimulus
appears. In the case of an N-back condition, a response is required
when a stimulus is the same as one appearing n stimuli earlier in
the sequence. As the n increases the cognitive load onWM also in-
creases. Interference on performance resulting from the inclusion
of drug-related nontarget stimuli in the sequence may result
from a combination of explicit and implicit processes in drug
addiction.
According to the dual process theory of addiction (Wiers and
Stacy 2006), the cascade of events leading to drug-approach behav-
iors is supposed to occur implicitly, under the influence of stimuli
associated with the substance (see also Tiffany 1990). Explicit mo-
tives activated in parallel support cognitive control mechanisms
and aremeant to impede or limit such tendencies. This tradeoff be-
tween an implicit appetitive system triggered by drug-related stim-
uli and an explicit cognitive control system based on regulatory
executive signals can explain results such as those obtained in
the alcohol flanker task (Nikolaou et al. 2013b).
Most experiments have investigated this matter using stimuli
explicitly associated with a substance (e.g., alcohol bottles or
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cigarettes) for which the stimulus–outcome contingency is clearly
defined due to their own nature, thus impeding an accurate explo-
ration of implicit components of drug addiction. Even though the
procedures themselves, based on task-irrelevant distractor effects,
are thought to be implicit, the explicit attributes of drug-related
stimuli generated through prior consumption experiences (Wiers
et al. 2002) may affect task outcomes (Leganes-Fonteneau et al.
2018). Stimuli conditioned with nondrug rewards can generate
value-driven responses equivalent to those of drug-related stimuli
(Anderson et al. 2011), both attentional (Hogarth et al. 2006a;
Jeffs and Duka 2017) and emotional (i.e., Austin and Duka 2010).
As detailed by Anderson (2016), reward CS can, in a similar way
as drug-related cues, override the interference of cognitive goals
(e.g., Le Pelley et al. 2015), drive approach behaviors (e.g., San
Martín et al. 2016), resist extinction procedures (e.g., Anderson
and Yantis 2013), and trigger dopaminergic responses (Anderson
et al. 2016b). This enables the use of reward learning procedures
as an “in-vitro” model of addiction in laboratory settings.
However, in seeking to investigate the mechanisms underly-
ing responsiveness toward reward-related stimuli, a key question
is whether those responses can occur without conscious awareness
(CA) of outcome contingencies, that is, in the absence of predictive
knowledge about associations between conditioned stimuli (CS)
and rewards. The ability of implicit reward-CS associations to pro-
ducehedonic and attentional responses has generated an extensive
discussion (Lovibond and Shanks 2002), with research showing in-
consistent results. Recent findings (Le Pelley et al. 2017), as well as
previous research (i.e., Hogarth et al. 2005, 2006a), appear to show
that CA is necessary for the development of responses in Pavlovian
appetitive conditioning. These results may stem from the inade-
quacy of procedures used to assess learning, both in the measure-
ment of conditioned responses (De Houwer 2006) and CA
(Lovibond and Shanks 2002).
In a recent series of experiments, in which CA was carefully
measured using a novel Bayesian approach (Dienes 2015; Sand
and Nilsson 2016), we found that targets, paired with increased
probabilities of monetary reward, gathered preferential attention
in an Emotional Attentional Blink task (Leganes-Fonteneau et al.
2018). Importantly, this was observed in participants Unaware of
stimulus–reward contingencies. These results are in line with the
postulate that reward predictive stimuli can modulate attentional
processes (Failing and Theeuwes 2017) even in the absence of CA.
As discussed above, research in the field of drug addiction has
demonstrated preferential attentional responses toward task-irrele-
vant reward-related stimuli; made apparent by their influence on
cognitive processes (Hester and Garavan 2009; Nikolaou et al.
2013b). Similar results have been obtained using secondary rein-
forcers. For example, using a modified color-naming Stroop task
in which certain task-relevant colors (e.g., a blue font) were as-
sociated with monetary outcomes (Krebs et al. 2010), it was found
that those colors facilitated task performance. Interestingly, the in-
centive value of rewarded colors subsequently transferred to
task-irrelevant words associated with rewarded stimuli (e.g., the
word “blue”), this time generating increased interference. This
was considered an example of implicit reward learning. However,
in this case, as in others (i.e., Anderson 2015), the implicit nature
of the effect generated by CS can only be postulated as no stringent
measures of CA were implemented. Anderson et al. (2012, 2016a)
also reported the effect of CS as distractors on a modified flanker
task, but again without examining the implicit aspects of learning.
Dual process theories of addiction (Wiers and Stacy 2006) in-
dicate that the chain of events leading to appetitive behaviors is
based on implicit processes triggered by CS. It is not clear however
if stimuli implicitly associated with a drug, without conscious
knowledge of outcome contingencies, can set off drug-approach
behaviors (Hogarth et al. 2006a).
To help clarify this matter we investigated whether CS in
the absence of CA can generate task-irrelevant interferences in cog-
nitive control. As in previous research high reward (HR) CS gener-
ated preferential attentional responses in Unaware participants
(Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018), we expect here to replicate those
findings and that HR stimuli will interfere with inhibitory control
to a greater extent than low reward (LR), again in the absence of
CA. This would allow us to draw a parallel between the ability of
implicitly CS to affect executive control (Anderson 2016) and the
interference of drug cues on inhibitory mechanisms (Wiers and
Stacy 2006).
To make sure that Pavlovian associations would occur in the
absence of awareness we utilized a task-irrelevant reward learning
procedure (Yokoyama et al. 2015), pairing stimuli belonging to
two different categories withHR or LR probabilities ofmonetary re-
ward.Using task-irrelevant procedures, it is possible to direct the fo-
cus of attention away from the stimulus–reward outcome, and in
this way, delay explicit learning of stimulus–reward associations.
We measured CA and metacognitive knowledge about contingen-
cies on a trial-by-trial basis (Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018) to deter-
mine the explicit knowledge about outcome contingencies gained
by participants. Using a Bayesian analysis for this purpose, wewere
able to gather sensitive evidence for the existence of nonconscious
learning. Finally, emotional responses toward CS were measured,
and the interferenceofCSoncognitiveprocesseswas assessedusing
modified flanker and N-back tasks with different degrees of cogni-
tive load.
We hypothesized that CS would have an effect on perfor-
mance for both the N-back and flanker tasks depending on their
value (HR vs. LR) and that the extent to which participants were
Aware or Unaware of the contingencies would modulate that
interference.
Results
Questionnaires
Groupswerematchedonall baseline indices (i.e., Barratt Impulsive-
ness Scale—BIS, Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test—AUDIT,
Alcohol Use Questionnaire—AUQ, Positive and Negative Affect
Schedule—PANAS, and Bodily Perception Questionnaire—BPQ;
P>0.2, in all cases) except for Reversed Digit Span (see Table 1).
Groups also did not differ in the distribution of male and female
participants, χ2(1, N=36) = 1.446, P= 0.229 (ratio of female/total:
8/20 for Unaware and 10/16 for Aware).
Pleasantness
There was a main effect of stimulus-type, F(1,34) = 10.015, P=0.003,
reflecting, irrespective of CA, increased pleasantness ratings
toward HR (mean=55.29, SD=0.16) compared to LR CS (mean=
43.97, SD=0.17).
This main effect was quantified by a significant CA by
stimulus-type interaction, F(1,34) = 7.899, P=0.008. Thus, Aware
participants rated HR CS as being more pleasant than LR CS, t
(15) = 3.182, P=0.006, BU(0,0.06) = 3.3998. In contrast, there was
no sensitive difference in pleasantness ratings between HR and
LR CS in the Unaware group, t(19) = 0.362, P=0.721, BU(0,0.06) =
0.9054 (see Fig. 1).
N-back
Accuracy N-back
For Aware participants, the analysis of the percentage of correct re-
sponses showed a main effect of load, F(1,45) = 29.307, P<0.001,
with participants performing less accurately in 2-back blocks
(mean=79.43, SD=8.22) than in 0-back blocks (mean=90.10,
Implicit reward learning and cognitive control
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SD=7.89). Similarly, Unaware participants also had lower accuracy
scores in the 2-back (mean=84.65, SD=7.95) than the 0-back con-
dition (mean=88.49, SD=10.83); main effect of load, F(1,54) =
8.006, P=0.007. Therewere no other significantmain effects or in-
teractions neither for Aware nor for Unaware participants when
looking at the percentage of correct responses, Fs < 0.427, P>0.516.
Analyses of net differences, resulted in no significant main ef-
fects or interactions neither for Aware, nor for Unaware partici-
pants, Fs < 0.935, ps > 0.338.
For proportion of correct Hits, there were no significant inter-
actions or main effects, neither for Aware, nor for Unaware partic-
ipants, Fs < 1.638, ps > 0.207.
Latencies N-back
With respect to latencies taking into account all trials, Aware par-
ticipants were overall slower on 2-back trials (mean=2.76, SD=
0.13) compared to 0-back trials (mean=2.74, SD=0.10); main ef-
fect of load, F(1,15) = 5.624, P=0.032. There were no other signifi-
cant main effects or interactions in the Aware group, Fs < 2.597,
ps > 0.128. The analysis performed in the Unaware group did not
result in any statistically significant main effect or interaction, Fs
< 1.015, ps > 0.327.
With respect to latencies on target trials only: the analysis in
the Aware group showed a marginally significant main effect of
stimulus-type, F(1,15) = 3.367, P=0.086, indicating that latencies
to LR targets were faster (mean=2.70, SD=0.07) than to HR targets
(mean=2.72, SD=0.07). In addition, there was a marginally sig-
nificant stimulus-type by load interaction, F(1,15) = 3.875, P=
0.068. Post hoc paired-samples t-tests showed that responses on
HR target trials were marginally slower than responses on LR target
trials in the 2-back block, t(15) = 2.122, P=0.051 (see Fig. 2). No
other simple effect was statistically significant, P>0.149. Finally,
the main effect of load was not statistically significant, F(1,15) =
0.587, P=0.456.
For Unaware participants, there were no statistically signifi-
cant main effects or interactions, F<1.733, P>0.205, in all cases.
Flanker task
Accuracy flanker
For Unaware participants there was a main effect of stimulus-type
on accuracy, F(2,85) = 6.834, P=0.002, explained by significantly
lower accuracy overall on HR (mean=94.90, SD=3.84) compared
to Control trials (mean=97.07, SD=2.28), Z=3.675, P<0.001,
and marginally lower accuracy on LR (mean=95.68, SD=3.84)
than Control trials, Z=1.945, P= 0.052. There was no significant
difference in accuracy between HR and LR trials, Z=0.857, P=
0.391. The main effect of congruency was also significant, F(1,85)
= 152.970, P<0.001, and reflected increased accuracy in general
on congruent (mean=99.38, SD=1.05) than incongruent trials
(mean=92.39, SD=5.03). Both of these main effects were quanti-
fied by an interaction between stimulus-type and congruency in
the Unaware group, F(2,85) = 6.420, P=0.002, due to accuracy being
higher for Control than HR stimuli across levels of congruency,
χ2(1) = 12.807, P=0.001. Wilcoxon post hoc tests showed a signifi-
cant difference between Control and HR trials in the incongruent
condition, Z=2.255, P=0.024, that did not occur in the congruent
condition, Z= .447, P=0.655 (see Table 2).
Similarly, for Aware participants, there was also a main effect
of stimulus-type on accuracy, F(2,70) = 7.820, P<0.001, explained
by overall lower accuracy for HR (mean=93.43, SD=5.39) com-
pared to Control trials (mean=95.37, SD=5.98), Z=3.819, P<
0.001, and lower accuracy on LR (mean=93.06, SD=7.48) com-
pared toControl trials,Z= 2.111, P=0.035. Therewas no difference
in accuracy between HR and LR trials, Z=0.175, P= 0.861.
Figure 1. Pleasantness toward conditioned stimuli. Pleasantness ratings
toward high-reward and low-reward stimuli depending on contingency
awareness. *Only Aware participants developed preferential emotional re-
sponses toward high-reward stimuli, t(15) = 3.182, P=0.006.
Table 1. Results and descriptives comparing questionnaires and demographic scores between contingency Aware and Unaware participants
Contingency Aware n=16 Contingency Unaware n=20
Between-group comparison
Mean SD Mean SD t(34) P
Age 20.13 5.39 19.55 1.23 0.165 0.870
BIS-11 63.81 8.20 64.2 5.87 1.136 0.264
AUDIT 7.69 4.70 7.8 5.52 0.886 0.382
Binge score 25.69 16.45 19.29 17.06 0.486 0.630
AUQ score 41.43 25.53 33.5 27.51 0.983 0.333
PANAS Positive 0.47 0.15 0.44 0.20 0.165 0.870
Porges 2.52 0.50 2.31 0.75 1.136 0.264
Mean SD Mean SD Z P
Reverse Digit 3.21 0.97 4.13 1.26 2.903 0.043
PANAS Negative 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.161 0.888
Implicit reward learning and cognitive control
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The main effect of congruency was also significant, F(1,70) =
146.051, P<0.001, and reflected increased accuracy in general
on congruent (mean=99.14, SD=1.13) than incongruent trials
(mean=88.77, SD=11.08). There was however no interaction be-
tween stimulus-type and congruency, F(2,70) = 2.360, P=0.102.
Flanker effect
Unaware participants showed amain effect of stimulus-type, F(2,34)
= 6.506, P=0.004. HR CS generated more interference than both
LR, P=0.042, or Control stimuli, P=0.006 (see Fig. 3).
This was not observed, in Aware participants, F(2,28) = 0.606,
P=0.553.
Differences between groups
Out of the three-way bootstrapping procedure, we found that the
flanker effect was significantly lower in Unaware compared to
Aware participants for LR, 95% CI [−39.25 to −2.27], and
Control stimuli, 95% CI [−40.29 to −7.67], but not for HR stimuli,
95% CI [−15.89 to 17.05]. This highlights the differences between
Aware and Unaware participants in the interference generated by
CS. See Supplementary Materials for complete results of the boot-
strapped comparisons of between-group effects.
Discussion
The present study set out to examine the extent towhich rewardCS
can interfere with cognitive processing and the degree to which
this remains true in the absence of CA. By using a task-irrelevant
Pavlovian conditioning paradigm and setting stringent criteria in
the determination of CA, it was possible to reliably identify implic-
it influences. The use of a Bayesian approach provides a sensitive
measurement of the unconscious nature of learning, countering
otherwise well-grounded methodological criticisms regarding
measurements of implicit learning (Lovibond and Shanks 2002),
due to lax determinations of unconscious processes (Shanks 2016).
We observed significant differences between groups in re-
sponse latencies generated by CS. The flanker effect was higher
for HR CS compared to LR or Control, albeit only in participants
Unaware of the contingencies. On the other hand, in the N-back
task, under high cognitive load, a higher interference in the pres-
ence of HR CS compared to LR CS was only found in Aware partic-
ipants. Subjective hedonic responses to HR CS, as measured by
pleasantness ratings, were also only seen in participants Aware of
contingencies; Unaware participants displayed an insensitive re-
sponse pattern.
The development of hedonic responses congruent with re-
ward signaling only in Aware participants clarifies recent findings
(Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018) suggesting that CA is necessary
for the development of subjective emotional responses. Previous
research from our own group had found instances of hedonic re-
sponses in the absence of CA (Jeffs and Duka 2017). These incon-
gruent results may again be due to the use of less stringent CA
categorizations. However, insensitive results, with regard to pleas-
antness for Unaware participants (as shown with Bayesian analy-
ses), indicate that we cannot fully discard the development of
such responses also in this group. Other factors contributing to
the development of hedonic conditioned responses, such as inter-
oceptive abilities (Pollatos and Schandry 2008), may ultimately
help resolve such disparities. However, it seems clear that the as-
sessment of subjective hedonic responses is by no means an ade-
quate tool for the examination of implicit learning (De Houwer
2006). Finally, demand characteristics may explain why Aware
participants rate HR stimuli as more pleasant, not because of an ac-
quired incentive value, but as a need to comply with the awareness
of contingencies.
As expected, decreases in performance (accuracy and laten-
cies) were found for the flanker task, in the incongruent compared
to the congruent condition; also, as expected in theN-back task, ac-
curacy decreased in the 2-back compared to the 0-back blocks,
showing the suitability of the procedures to generate increased cog-
nitive load.
Results of the flanker task are in line with data recently ob-
tained by our group (Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018) and by others
(i.e., Bourgeois et al. 2016) demonstrating the ability of reward
CS to grab preferential attention implicitly. This interference is
also congruent with previous examples of reward conditioning ef-
fects on a flanker task (Anderson et al. 2012, 2016a). HR CS, paired
with increased probabilities of reward, generated more cognitive
Figure 2. Reaction times during the N-back task between Aware and
Unaware participants for Hits. *For Aware participants Latencies in the
2-back condition toward high reward were higher than those toward
low reward, P=0.051.
Table 2. Accuracy during the flanker task. Accuracy during the flanker task depending on contingency awareness, cognitive load, and
stimulus-type
Congruent Incongruent
High reward Low reward Control High reward Low reward Control
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Unaware 99.54 1.07 98.92 2.88 99.69 0.90 90.28 7.70 92.44 5.94 94.44 4.57
Aware 99.07 1.36 98.52 2.54 99.81 0.72 87.78 10.85 87.59 13.36 90.93 11.38
Implicit reward learning and cognitive control
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interference compared to LR CS. Importantly that happened solely
for participants Unaware of contingencies. These results are rele-
vant enough by themselves as they provide further evidence for
the existence of implicit Pavlovian conditioning effects.
Researchfindings relating to the nature of the attentional pro-
cesses underlying task interference by irrelevant distractors have
proven to be inconsistent. On one hand, attentional resources
are posited to be necessary for task interference (Pessoa and
Ungerleider 2004) countering the argument of automaticity of sali-
ence effects and converging with the interpretation of attentional
biases toward drug cues acting as a top-down albeit involuntary
mechanism (Brown et al. 2018). However, value-driven attentional
capture (Anderson et al. 2011) is also posited to occur involuntari-
ly. In our case, as the interference generated by HR CS occurs with-
out CA of their reward predictive value, we can posit that their
influence is implicit, devoid of goal-directedness.
The ability of CS to interfere with cognitive control tasks in a
stimulus-driven fashion has twofold implications for implicit the-
ories of addiction. On the one hand, this mere effect shows that
stimuli associated with a reward can generate approach behaviors
in a nondeclarative or explicit way and can interfere with cognitive
control mechanisms. Considering the similarities between experi-
mental models of reward learning and the attentional correlates of
addiction (Anderson 2016) our results provide further evidence for
the relevance of implicit processes in substance use disorders
(Wiers and Stacy 2006). This implies a need to reconsider how cog-
nitive control interference induced by drug-related stimuli implic-
itly can be tested. Explicit drug cues typically utilized in relevant
experiments (e.g., pictures of alcohol bottles for alcohol-related
cognitive bias) might not allow implicit mechanisms involved in
cognitive biases to be revealed. On the other hand, if we consider
that the effects of reward-associated cues can occur on cognitive in-
terference implicitly, as shown here, we can extrapolate and add to
our understanding of mechanisms underlying drug-cue interfer-
ence in cognitive control (i.e., on an equivalent flanker task
Nikolaou et al. 2013b), that drug-cue interference could be affect-
ed, at least partially, via implicit and involuntary processes de-
tached from goal-directedness (Hester and Garavan 2009).
It is puzzling that Aware participants did not show a stronger
flanker effect of HR CS compared to LR CS compared to Unaware
participants. This might be explained by an overall decrease in
baseline performance for Aware participants (illustrated by higher
flanker effect for Control trials in Aware compared to Unaware par-
ticipants, (t(31) = 2.302, P=0.028). Such an effect could impede an
appropriate interference by HR CS. Another possibility is that
due to the conscious knowledge about contingencies, participants
were consciously trying to identify the HR CS (exploiting atten-
tional resources to achieve this), in order tominimize their interfer-
ence. Such a cognitive process could explain the high flanker effect
seen also in Control trials for that group.
On the N-back task, stimulus interference was observed only
for Aware participants. Under high cognitive load (2-back condi-
tion), latencies for Hits in the presence of HR CS were longer
than toward LR CS. We can assume that this effect is due to the in-
creased salience of HR CS.
It seems therefore that cognitive mechanisms underlying ap-
proach to reward-related stimuli tested by different tasks are influ-
enced differently by CA. CS effects in the flanker task can be
explained according to bias competition models (Desimone and
Duncan 1995) by which under limited attentional resources
(such as high cognitive load) salient stimuli will grab attention
and interfere with the task (Vuilleumier 2005), in our case implic-
itly. Regarding the specific mechanisms by which the interference
of HR CS occurs in the flanker task, we can draw several hypoth-
eses. One possibility is that HR stimuli broaden the focus of atten-
tion toward the stimulus compound, and as such more attention
is allocated as well to the distracting arrows, increasing their inter-
ference with cognitive control. Another possibility is that atten-
tion is directed toward HR stimuli and away from the main
task, impacting task performance. Finally, HR stimuli may have
a broad effect on cognitive control, impairing the ability to inhib-
it the interference of incongruent flankers. Further understanding
the mechanisms by which implicitly CS exert their interference
in cognitive control might also help understand how other
reward-related stimuli (i.e., drug cues) generate such effects.4
We need however to explain why no effects were found in
the N-back task for Unaware participants. The N-back task differs
from the flanker task as it requires less attentional demand (de-
tecting a color vs. a target arrow embedded in distractors) but in-
volves more complex cognitive processes (recalling the color of a
previous image to respond, while at the same time ignoring target
irrelevant information vs. overcoming distractors). Previous re-
search found that masked presentations of emotional distractors
altered N-back performance, albeit not for high load trials (Uher
et al. 2014). It is possible that interference on the N-back task
does not directly target attentional mechanisms but rather WM
and inhibitory processes (Kensinger and Corkin 2003), and that
a more conscious presentation of distractors, or of their incentive
value, is necessary for interference to occur in WM (LeDoux
2002). It is possible as well that on the N-back task it was easier
to overcome the effect of CS as distractors by focusing on the col-
or of the frame, whereas on the flanker task CS appeared under-
neath the relevant arrows. This may explain the lack of clearer
results using this task overall.
The results obtained in this study are subject to a number of
limitations. The effects of HR CS on response latencies in the
N-back task are observed solely on accurate target trials, that is,
on relatively few instances, maybe because HR CS only affect trials
in which the colored frame matches the 2-back stimulus, interfer-
ing with target recognition.
The observation that interference in the flanker task was not
found for Aware participants remains to be fully explained.
While it may be possible to provide an account of these results
based on the effect of conscious knowledge about contingencies,
Figure 3. Flanker scores. Latency difference scores for congruent versus
incongruent trials in the flanker task by contingency awareness and
stimulus-type. *For Unaware participants, high cognitive load generates
more interference in HR trials compared to LR, t(17) = 2.740, P=0.014,
and control stimuli, t(17) = 3.615, P=0.002.
4We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting these mechanisms.
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it would be informative to compare the effect of emotional stimuli
or masked distractors to the interference generated by CS on both
tasks (Nikolaou et al. 2013a).
A final limitation of this study is the seemingly underpowered
sample. This is partially due to the use of a Bayesian categorization
which implies a proportion of the sample will be discarded due to
their insensitive results on contingency awareness. Asmuch as this
constitutes a limitation of the methodology, the need to improve
the way implicit cognitions are represented (Dienes 2015) justifies
it. Further studies on implicit conditioning should aim at clarifying
our results, particularly the N-back task, by increasing the sample
size. The results on the flanker task seem however to provide suffi-
cient evidence for the existence of implicit learning effects.
Additionally, we have limited the comparison between Aware
and Unaware participants to the categorization obtained using
Type I scores. Type II scores were vastly insensitive in this study,
precluding their use as an effective categorization tool. Still, the
role of metacognitive CA in the development of learning deserves
future explorations.
In conclusion, implicit processes play a crucial role in the de-
velopment of drug addiction, particularly in drug-approach behav-
iors. We observed a clear interference in cognitive control by
stimuli conditioned with reward in the absence of CA. This effect
provides further evidence for the existence of implicit Pavlovian
conditioning and has implications for the understanding of dual
process theories of addiction. Uncovering implicit mechanisms
of drug-approach behaviors may prove essential for the develop-
ment of novel treatments in substance use disorders.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Forty-nine Psychology students from theUniversity of Sussex com-
pleted the experiment (mean age =20.04, SD=3.34; 25 females).
Exclusion criteria were a history of mental disease and undergoing
heavy medical treatment at the time of the study. All participants
were given course credits and £2 for taking part in the study, and
the study was approved by the University of Sussex Life Sciences
Ethics Committee.
Measures
Questionnaires
Reversed Digit Span measurements were used to index WM capac-
ity (Wechsler 2008; Redick and Lindsey 2013).
The AUQ (Mehrabian and Russell 1978) was used to assess av-
erageweekly alcohol use over the past 6mo. The questionnaire also
provides a binge drinking score based on the speed of alcohol con-
sumption, and the number as well as the proportion of times that
participants were drunk in the last 6 mo (Townshend and Duka
2002).
Severity of alcohol use wasmeasured with the 10-item AUDIT
(Saunders et al. 1993). Alcohol scores were measured as an explora-
tion of the relationship between addictive disorders and aberrant
reward processing (Balodis and Potenza 2015).
The PANAS (Watson et al. 1988) was used to measure posi-
tive and negative mood at the start of the study session. Partici-
pants rate how they feel at that moment using a 5-point Likert
scale (1 = “very slightly,” 5= “extremely”). The questionnaire con-
sists of 10 items per construct.
The Body Perception Questionnaire (BPQ; Porges 1993) is a
45-item questionnaire evaluating the subjective ability to detect
internal bodily sensations. Participants had to indicate on a
5-point Likert scale (1 = “never,” 5 = “always”) the frequency with
which they felt different sensations, for example, facial twitches
or bowel movements. This questionnaire, as well as other intero-
ceptive measurements, was obtained in the context of a secondary
analysis on the role interoceptive processing in reward learning,
not detailed in this paper.
Finally, the BIS (Patton et al. 1995) is a 30-item questionnaire
evaluating different factors contributing to overall impulsiveness,
namely, Attentional, Motor, and Nonplanning impulsivity.
Conditioning task
A task-irrelevant conditioning procedure (Yokoyama et al. 2015;
Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018) was implemented in order to train
participants to associate high and low probabilities of monetary re-
ward with two different categories of CS. Thirty-six geometrical
stimuli belonging to each CS category (squares vs. octagons) were
produced with Ink-Scape vector design software.5
On each trial, a stimulus fromoneCS category (i.e., a square or
an octagon) was presented on the computer screen with an over-
laid green- or yellow-colored square. Participants were asked to
press a green or yellow key depending on the color of the square.
Stimuli remained on screen for 2000 msec or until a response
was made. If the response was correct, participants could win
10p. For HR CS, the probability of winning was 90%. For LR CS,
the probability was 10%. After a response was recorded feedback
about the outcome of the trial was provided (“You win 10p” or
“You win nothing”) for 1500 msec. Trial outcomes depended
solely on the CS presented during the trial and the associated prob-
abilities of reward. The stimulus category was counterbalanced
across participants.
On 50% of the HR trials and on 50% of the LR trials, partici-
pants had to indicate if they thought they would win money
(Yes/No expectancy responses). Following the expectancy re-
sponse, they were also asked to rate how confident they were about
their response on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = “completely guessing,”
2= “more or less guessing,” 3= “fairly sure,” 4 = “almost certain,”
5= “completely certain”). The measurement of accuracy and con-
fidence on reward prediction allowed us to determine participants’
metacognitive knowledge about contingencies (Barrett et al. 2013).
The conditioning procedure comprised a total of five blocks,
with 72 trials in each block. At the end of each block, participants
transferred the amount earned coins from a bank box to their
“earnings” box. At the end of the final block, they were told how
much money they had won in total.
Participants were kept naïve about the contingencies be-
tween the CS categories and the reward outcome probabilities
although they were told that they could win money at the end of
each trial. They were also told that they would be asked a series
of questions about their expectancy and confidence and that their
responses to those questions would not affect the outcome of the
trial in terms of reward probability.
Pleasantness measurement
Immediately after the conditioning procedure participants rated
the pleasantness associated with each category of CS. Eighteen
squares and 18 octagons (randomly selected from the original 72
stimuli) were presented in a random order, one at a time, and par-
ticipants were asked to rate how pleasant they found each stimulus
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 =not pleasant at all; 5 = extremely
pleasant).
CS N-back task
Each trial of the CS N-back task began with a fixation cross in the
center of screen (jittered 1–3 sec; average 2 sec). This was followed
by the stimulus display for 500 msec, followed by a response inter-
val for 1000 msec.
The stimulus display consisted of a CS surrounded by a col-
ored frame. On 50% of the trials, the CS was a HR CS, whereas
5See Leganes-Fonteneau et al. (2018) for a detailed description of stimulus
development, Figures 4 and 5, for example, and Supplementary Material for
the complete collection of stimuli: https://osf.io/t9qu6/?view_only=
242170271cc1418aae7bb65f6c744f85.
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on the remainder 50% of the trials it was a LR CS. The color of the
frame was either a primary color (i.e., red, blue, and yellow) or a
nonprimary color (pink, orange, and green).
The task consisted of two conditions. In the 0-back condition,
participants were instructed to press one button if the color of the
framewas a primary color (target trial) and another button if it was
a nonprimary color (control trial) as quickly and as accurately as
possible. In the 2-back condition, participants had to remember
the color of the frame and press one button if the color of the frame
matched the one shown two trials before (target trial) and another
button if the colors did not match (see Fig. 4).
A total of eight blocks (four 0-back and four 2-back) were pre-
sented in an ABAB order. A 0-back block was always presented first.
At the start of each block, a short instructions screen (jittered dura-
tion 4–8 sec, average 6 sec) remindedparticipantswhat they should
do in that block.
Each block consisted of eight control and four target trials. In
half of the control trials and in half of the target trials, the image
presented was a HR CS, with the other half being LR CS. In order
to match the visual properties of each block, target trials always
consisted of primary colors and control trials of nonprimary colors
regardless of the N-back condition. Within blocks, the colors sur-
rounding HR and LR CS were also matched.
In each 2-back block, at least one (maximum two) lure trials
were introduced. These trials were control trials in which the color
of the frame matched the one presented 1-back or 1-forward. Lure
trials were allocated equally often between HR and LR image
conditions.
The percentage of correct responses was calculated for each
N-back and stimulus-type condition separately. We also computed
the proportion of Hits (proportion of accurate Target trials), and
net differences subtracting False Alarms rates (proportion of
“target-like” responses on Control trials) from the proportion of
Hits for each of the conditions. Reaction times to correct responses
(i.e., latencies) were calculated for each N-back and stimulus-type
condition. Reaction times to correct target trials (i.e., latencies for
Hits) were also computed separately for each N-back and stimulus-
type condition.
Finally, participants completed two practice blocks, one for
each N-back condition, in which a plain gray background was pre-
sented as part of the stimulus display. Aminimumaccuracy of 65%
in each practice block was required to proceed to the real task.
Participants not reaching this threshold were given the task in-
structions again and repeated the practice blocks.
CS flanker task
The task was adapted from Nikolaou and colleagues (2013a).
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross for a
jittered duration (850–1150 msec), followed by the stimulus dis-
play for 800msec, and a response interval for 700msec (see Fig. 5).
The stimulus display consisted of a horizontal row of five ar-
rows superimposed on either a plain gray background, or on
task-unrelated background images that belonged to either the HR
or the LR CS categories. The central arrow was the target, and
was surrounded by two distracting arrows (flankers) on either
side. Participants were instructed to ignore the flankers and press
one key if the central arrow was pointing to the left, and another
key if it was pointing to the right, as quickly and accurately as pos-
sible. In the congruent condition flankers pointed in the same di-
rection as the target (e.g., < < < < <). In the incongruent condition
flankers pointed in the opposite direction to the target (e.g., > > < >
>, bold font added only for illustration). There were four different
flanker and target combinations (target pointing left or right and
flankers pointing left or right).
Each of the flanker combinations was superimposed on each
of 20 selected HR and LR CS images, to generate 80 HR and 80
LR trials (40 in the congruent and 40 in the incongruent condi-
tion). An additional 40 congruent and 40 incongruent trials with
a plain gray background (i.e., control trials) were also included to
generate a single task block of 240 trials in total. Trial order was
pseudorandomized to avoid presentation of the same background
and same congruency condition for more than three consecutive
trials.
Mean latencies and accuracy scores (% of correct responses)
were computed for each background image (i.e., HR, LR, and
Control) under both the congruent and incongruent conditions.
The flanker effect was also computed for each image condition sep-
arately as the difference in average latency in the incongruent con-
dition minus the average latency in the congruent condition.
Participants completed 40 practice trials, 20 congruent and 20
incongruent, with only the gray plain background before themain
block. A minimum accuracy of 70%was required to proceed to the
experimental block (achieved by all participants).
Figure 4. N-back task. The task consisted of two different conditions. In the 0-back condition, participants indicated whether the color of the framewas a
primary or a nonprimary color. In the 2-back condition, they had to indicate whether the color of the frame matched the one presented two trials before.
High- and low-reward CS were task-irrelevant.
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Procedure
Each participant completed a single testing session. They first gave
written informed consent that they agreed to take part in the study.
This was followed by the completion of the AUQ, AUDIT, PANAS,
BIS-11, and BPQ. They then completed two tasks designed to mea-
sure interoceptive awareness (detailed in Garfinkel et al. (2015), see
Supplemental Materials for data), followed by the reward condi-
tioning procedure and pleasantness evaluation. Finally, they com-
pleted the CS N-back and flanker tasks in a counterbalanced order.
At the end of the experiment, they were debriefed and compensat-
ed for their participation.
Data analysis
Bayesian analysis
Bayesian analyses provide a statistical tool with which the sensitiv-
ity of results can be determined. This way it is possible to extract
conclusions from nonsignificant findings generated by frequentist
statistical approaches (Dienes 2014). A Bayes factor (B) above 3
shows compelling evidence toward the alternative hypothesis
(i.e., two means are different), whereas a B below 1/3 provides sub-
stantial evidence toward the null hypothesis (i.e., there is no differ-
ence between two means). A B between 3 and 1/3 implies there is
not enough evidence in either direction.
Bayes factorswere used (a) as a tool for sensitive categorization
of participants into those whowere aware of the CS-HR/LR contin-
gencies and thosewhowere not (see Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018
for details and below for a summary) and (b) to examine the sensi-
tivity of within group comparisons of the pleasantness ratings (see
“Pleasantness” below).
Contingency awareness categorization
Determining the unconscious nature of a mental process requires
evidence of an inability or failure to consciously perceive that pro-
cess. This typically involves asserting the null hypothesis that per-
formance on some knowledge-related task is no different to
chance, which cannot be evaluated using traditional frequentist
statistical analyses (Dienes 2015). Therefore, a Bayesian approach
(Sand and Nilsson 2016) was used to categorize participants as
Aware or Unaware of contingencies using the data gathered from
the conditioning procedure (Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018).
Using Signal Detection Theory methods (Stanislaw and
Todorov 1999; Barrett et al. 2013), we computed the number of
Type I: Hits (responding “Yes” on aHR trial), Correct Rejections (re-
sponding “No” on a LR trial), False Alarms (responding “Yes” on a
LR trial), andMisses (responding “No” on a HR trial) from blocks 4
and 5 of the conditioning task. Type I scores reflect performance
accuracy.
Type II scores provide an account of themetacognitive knowl-
edge generated during the task using the relationship between ac-
curacy and confidence responses (Kunimoto et al. 2001).
Confidence responses were transformed to a dichotomous vari-
able: responses of two or below (i.e., “more or less guessing” or
“completely guessing”) were classified as “not confident,” and
those above two as “highly confident.” Thus, a Type II Hit was de-
fined as a Type I Hit or Correct Rejection with high confidence; a
Correct Rejection as a Type I Miss or False Alarm with low confi-
dence; a False Alarm as a Type I Miss or False Alarm with high con-
fidence; and a Miss as a Type I Hit or Correct Rejection with low
confidence.
Logistic d1′ (Logd1′) and Standard Error d1′ (SEd1′) scores
were calculated for each participant as well as Logd2′ and Sed2′
scores. As d2′ scores rarely exceed d1′ scores (Dienes 2015), a
Bayes factor was calculated for each participant on their Logd2′
modeling H1 with a Uniform going from 0 (chance level) to their
own Logd1′ as a prior. Participants with B<1/3 were categorized
as Metacognitively Unaware, whereas those with a B>3 were con-
sidered Metacognitively Aware, and the rest as insensitive.
The mean Logd1’ score from those participants Metacogni-
tively Aware was used as a maximum for a uniform to model H1
in order to test the sensitivity of each participant’s Logd1’. Each
corresponding B allowed determining their CA as significant (i.e.,
aware of the stimulus–reward contingencies), sensitively null
(i.e., unaware of the contingencies), or insensitive (neither sensi-
tively aware nor unaware).6
Figure 5. Flanker task. Participants responded depending on the direction of the central arrow, which could be surrounded by congruent or incongruent
arrows. High- and low-reward conditioned stimuli as well as gray control backgrounds were task-irrelevant.
6TheMatLab script developed togenerate this categorization is available online and
can be used not only for learning tasks, but also for visual detection experiments:
https://osf.io/p7n9b/?view_only=8295819dae61452ebdf4b3d82ccc61c9.
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Out of the 49 participants who completed the study, on the
basis of Type II scores, seven had metacognitive awareness, 12
were definitely Unaware, and 30 showed an insensitive result.
On the basis of Type I scores, 16 participantswere categorized as be-
ing Aware of contingencies, 20 were Unaware, and 13 had an in-
sensitive Bayes factor.
Thus, participants could be categorized as Aware, Unaware, or
Insensitive both on a metacognitive and on a contingency aware-
ness level (see Table 3). All analyses reported belowwere performed
on the basis of Type I categorization and only with the 16 Aware
and 20 Unaware participants, discarding the 13 participants who
showed an Insensitive result.
Questionnaires
A series of independent samples t-tests compared age and scores on
questionnaires (BIS, AUDIT, AUQ, PANAS Positive, and BPQ) be-
tween Aware and Unaware groups. Due to violations of normality,
a Wilcoxon test was performed on PANAS Negative and Reverse
Digit Span data. A χ2 was computed to test for differences in gender
distribution.
Pleasantness
A 2×2mixed ANOVAwith stimulus-type (HR vs. LR) as thewithin,
and CA (Aware vs. Unaware) as the between subjects’ factor exam-
ined the effects of contingency awareness on pleasantness ratings
for HR/LR CS.
A Bayes factor using significant data from Leganes-Fonteneau
et al. (2018) as priors was computed for each group separately
to quantify differences in pleasantness ratings between HR and
LR CS.
N-back task
One participant was excluded from all analyses involving the
N-back task due to low accuracy in the 2-back condition (<54%).
Given the differences in sample size existing between Aware and
Unaware conditions analyses are conducted separately for each
group (Leganes-Fonteneau et al. 2018).
Accuracy
For each of the three accuracy indices we computed a 2 ×2 ANOVA
with stimulus-type (HR vs. LR) and load (0-back vs. 2-back) as
within-subject factors. Due to the observed violations of normality
(Shapiro-Wilk tests, ps < .004) that were nonamendable using
transformations, these ANOVAs were performed using ARTool
nonparametric analyses for nonnormal distributions in R
(Wobbrock et al. 2011).
Latencies
Due to violations of normality, all latency scores were log trans-
formed and analyses were performed on the log transformed
data. We examined latencies on all trials as well as latencies of tar-
get trials only in separate analyses. These analyses used 2×2
ANOVAs with stimulus-type (HR vs. LR) and load (0-back vs.
2-back) as within-subject factors, and significant interactions
were explored using paired-samples t-tests.
Flanker task
Participants with accuracy deviating by more than 2 SDs from the
mean in the congruent Control condition were considered to be
outliers (Nikolaou et al. 2013b) as their responses in such simple
trials (press a key in the direction of all the arrows presented on
screen with no distracting stimulus) should not be impaired and
may reveal a lack of attention. Consequently 3 participants were
excluded from all analyses involving flanker task data. As for the
analysis of the N-back task, all analyses described below were com-
puted in each group separately.
Accuracy
Normality was violated for all accuracy scores. Thus, analyses on
accuracy data were performed using ARTool. These used 2×2
ANOVAs with congruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and
stimulus-type (HR vs. LR vs. Control) as within-subject factors. χ2
was performed on interactions followed by Wilcoxon tests.
Latencies
Latency and flanker effect scores were normally distributed. In or-
der to examine differences in the flanker effect computed for the
Control, LR, andHR stimulus-type conditions, we used one-way re-
peated measures ANOVAs followed by Bonferroni-corrected con-
trasts for each group.
Analyses of latency data involving 2× 2 ANOVAs, with con-
gruency (congruent vs. incongruent) and stimulus-type (HR vs.
LR vs. Control) as within-subject factors are included in the
SupplementaryMaterials. Significantmain effects of stimulus-type
were followed by post hoc Bonferroni corrected contrasts.
Significant stimulus-type by congruency interactions were ex-
plored by running one-way repeated measures ANOVAs separately
at each level of congruency, and significant effects were followed
up further with Bonferroni-corrected contrasts.
Differences between groups
A set of additional analyses was performed on all the previously de-
scribed variables for both attentional tasks, including contingency
awareness as a between subjects’ effect to compare Aware and
Unaware groups. In order to overcome differences in sample size
and violations of normality a bootstrapping sampling procedure
with 1000 iterations was performed across a three-way mixed
ANOVA using ezBoot (“ez” package Lawrence and Lawrence
2016). 95% CIs for the differences between Aware and Unaware
participants were obtained across the stimulus by trial type interac-
tion and plotted using ezPlot2. Significant differences are reported
in the results section, and the complete results of this analysis are
available in the Supplementary Materials.
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